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1. Summary 
This rapid review synthesises the literature from academic, policy, and knowledge institution 
sources on how losing concessional finance could affect Small Island Developing States (SIDS) 
in their economic development. Graduation to higher income levels results in restrictions for 
access to concessional finance and development assistance: 
 SIDS that graduate to high-income status face several challenges in the loss of Official 
Development Assistance’s (ODA) associated financial and non-financial support.  
 When SIDS move from Lower Middle-Income Country (LMIC) to Upper Middle-Income 
Country (UMIC) status, they have to become less dependent on ODA for governmental 
expenditures and infrastructural investments, by increasing other funds and private 
sector investments.  
 SIDS that have been for a longer period middle-income economies have no access to 
concessional finance from multilateral organisations, while many bilateral development 
agencies are reducing concessional finance (even if SIDS have some access to 
concessional finance, it shifts away from grants).  
 There are all kinds of preferential trade measures for LDCs that will not apply for middle-
income countries without LDC status.  
Because most SIDS are middle-income countries, this means that, for the most part, they are not 
eligible to receive concessional resources from the multilateral financial institutions and 
preferential trade arrangements, although there may be some temporary exceptions based on 
vulnerability and smallness. It can be concluded from the literature that graduation does 
pose challenges for SIDS, although very different per country, and that it is not clear that 
graduation processes are well handled by both domestic governments and development 
agencies. This poses a threat for SIDS, in particular because they are extreme vulnerable for 
economic and natural shocks (e.g. price/demand changes and climate change) due to their 
geographical remoteness and small size, often resulting in high public debts.  
This rapid review illustrates with various examples that there are better-placed SIDS and worse 
placed SIDS, in terms of ability to adapt to changes that are the result of graduation. Overall, it 
appears that SIDS graduate through a combination of limited diversification towards 
services, especially tourism, and investment in human capital. The literature also shows 
clearly that there is little reason to expect that SIDS graduates see a direct positive effect on 
crucial things like private capital flows such as foreign direct investment (FDI), remittances and 
portfolio investment. In particular, LDCs that graduate to LMIC status, like Cabo Verde, show 
high dependency on ODA.  
Since the great majority of SIDS run structural current account deficits and are heavily 
reliant on external finance to support their capital accumulation, the implications of 
graduation for external financing are potentially critical. Disruptions to access to 
concessional financing may result in balance-of-payments problems, which could jeopardise the 
continuation of the development process that led to graduation. After graduation, Cabo Verde 
and Maldives have seen their expenses as percentage of GDP increased, like other SIDS as 
Mauritius and Seychelles.  
Not surprisingly, many UMIC SIDS seem to be stuck with high total debt payments due to 
their vulnerabilities to natural disasters in particular, reducing their ability to maximise 
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economic growth and invest in further economic development. Countries that are eligible for 
non-concessional finance only are precisely those countries in which debt problems have been 
more pronounced, e.g. Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Jamaica, the Seychelles and St. Kitts and 
Nevis. Graduates from LDC status Cabo Verde and Samoa have moved from “moderate” debt 
risks to “high” debt risk by the International Monetary Fund. Rising debt vulnerabilities in SIDS 
are related to fast global financial integration, open trade, lack of economies of scale, in particular 
combined with the exposure to natural disasters. Research indeed shows that debt to GDP ratios 
increase in SIDS following storms and floods and that the changes in debt ratios are statistically 
significant. 
It is less clear from the literature and available data how graduation impacts on human 
development. Unemployment, youth unemployment, income inequality and poverty are all 
common features in SIDS, however, there is no evidence that losing access to 
concessional finance and ODA is a major driver of this. In general, SIDS have shown 
consistent improvements in the human development index, although slowing down. However, on 
very specific topics graduation could have significant consequences for human development. For 
example, Cabo Verde’s ODA to education has fallen dramatically after graduation, resulting in a 
reduction in government spending on education. Overall, for all ODA recipient SIDS, 
investments in education are not meeting the need to produce the skilled workforce 
necessary to diversify their economies, increase productivity, employment and wages. 
Most important determinants for further progress include market size, resource and/or 
skill endowments, infrastructure, labour costs, tax and regulatory frameworks, and trade 
and investment agreements, which all need human capital and good governance to 
succeed. For example, good macroeconomic performance and a reliable financial sector tend to 
increase the likelihood that remittances are sent through official channels and are mobilised into 
diaspora investment. Therefore, SIDS need to access (technical) assistance from the 
international community in addressing economic and environmental vulnerabilities and 
associated catastrophic risks in combination with capacity development to access new 
funds and attract private sector investments (and improve forward and backward linkages 
with domestic businesses). The literature shows that many SIDS struggle to get access to 
these funds (e.g. Other Official Funds – OOF), such as Cabo Verde, while others succeed, such 
as the Maldives.  
Some lessons can be learned for development agencies to support a smooth graduation 
process for SIDS. The literature mentions the following: 
 A key issue is to integrate sustainable development criteria beyond income (e.g. 
vulnerability).  
 Transition support is needed and, particularly needs to be coordinated between agencies 
while providing support to renegotiate key economic policy agreements (e.g. preferential 
trade schemes, non-concessional finance and eligibility for ODA).  
 Key sectors such as infrastructure must be strengthened to attract the private sector and 
to ensure a return on investment to repay growing debt.  
 Debt is one of the main issues for SIDS after graduation, which means new and 
innovative ways should be found for debt restructuring and access new funds, like bonds 
in the Blue Economy or climate finance.  
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 Development partners can support national priorities in leveraging the vast array of 
resources in areas such as renewable energy that can spur additional investment 
opportunities and shift energy production, particularly solar and wind energy. 
Most of the literature used in this rapid review comes from multilateral organisations within the 
UN, World Bank Group and OECD. Overall, there is limited literature available on the real 
impacts of graduated SIDS from LDC status to higher income categories. Most literature 
has a focus on the general SIDS characteristics and their overall challenges for development, 
without explicitly mentioning graduation. The literature on graduated SIDS mainly mentions 
access to substitutional finance resources after losing out of concessional finance and ODA. Of 
that literature, the majority focusses on the recently graduated SIDS from LDC status (Cabo 
Verde, the Maldives and Samoa). Income graduation between LMIC to UMIC and to high-income 
countries is not mentioned frequently in the literature. It seems that there is a gap in the 
literature, in particular for academic research, to find evidence on the impacts of income 
graduation on state effectiveness, fragility and human development.  
2. Framing of SIDS and the graduation process 
Small Island Developing States (SIDS) are a distinct group of developing countries facing 
speciﬁc social, economic and environmental vulnerabilities. Fifty-eight countries and 
territories are presently classiﬁed as SIDS by the United Nations Office of the High 
Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small 
Island Developing States (UN-OHRLLS), of which 38 are UN members.1 Of this total, 35 SIDS 
are currently eligible for official development assistance (ODA) (OECD, 2018).2  
The majority of SIDS are middle-income countries, ranging from Lower Middle-Income Countries 
(LMICs) to Upper Middle-Income Countries (UMICs) (see Table 1). Recently, SIDS have been 
the main contributor for graduation from the status of Least Developed Countries (LDCs). 
So far, only five countries (among them three SIDS) have graduated from LDC status: Botswana 
(1994), Cape Verde (2007), Maldives (2011), Samoa (2014) and Equatorial Guinea (2017). In the 
next five years another 16 countries are expected to graduate beyond LDC status, among them 
six SIDS: Kiribati, Sao Tome and Principe, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu 
(UNCTAD, 2016). This means that all but three SIDS (Comoros, Guinea-Bissau and Haiti) are 
expected to gain a non-LDC status by 2024.  
 
                                                   
1 SIDS UN Members: 38 countries – Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Cape Verde, Comoros, Cuba, 
Dominica, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Kiribati, Maldives, Marshall Islands, 
Federated States of Micronesia, Mauritius, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, São Tomé and Príncipe, Singapore, St. 
Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Suriname, Timor-Leste, Tonga, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. SIDS non-UN Members: 20 countries - American Samoa, Anguilla, Aruba, 
Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Commonwealth of Northern Marianas, Cook Islands, Curacao, French 
Polynesia, Guadeloupe, Guam, Martinique, Montserrat, New Caledonia, Niue, Puerto Rico, Sint Maarten, Turks and Caicos 
Islands, and US Virgin Islands. Retrieved from UN OHRLLS website http://unohrlls.org/about-sids/country-profiles/ 
2 Most SIDS are part of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), an intergovernmental organisation of low-lying coastal and 
small island countries. Established in 1990, the main purpose of the alliance is to consolidate the voices of SIDS to address 
global warming. 
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Table 1. Classification of SIDS according to the World Bank, based on Gross National Income (GNI) 
per capita3   
Low-Income  
< US$1,025 
Lower Middle-Income 
US$1,026-US$3,995 
Upper Middle-Income 
US$3,996-US$12,375 
High-Income 
> US$12,376 
Guinea-Bissau 
Haiti 
 
Cabo Verde 
Comoros 
Kiribati* 
Federated States of 
Micronesia 
Papua New Guinea 
Sao Tome and Principe* 
Solomon Islands* 
Timor-Leste* 
Vanuatu* 
 
American Samoa 
Belize 
Cuba 
Dominica 
Dominican Republic 
Fiji 
Grenada 
Guyana 
Jamaica 
Maldives 
Marshall Islands 
Mauritius 
Nauru 
Samoa 
St. Lucia 
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
Suriname 
Tonga 
Tuvalu* 
Antigua and Barbuda 
Aruba 
Bahamas 
Bahrain 
Barbados 
Bermuda 
British Virgin Islands 
Cayman Islands 
Curacao 
French Polynesia 
Guam 
Puerto Rico 
Seychelles 
Singapore 
Sint Maarten 
St. Kitts and Nevis 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Turks and Caicos Islands 
Virgin Islands 
Italic = SIDS with current LDC status                * SIDS expected to gain non-LDC status by 2014 
The LDC status does not only apply for low-income economies, as Table 1 shows. For example, 
Comoros is according to the World Bank a LMIC with LDC status, and Tuvalu is currently an 
UMIC with LDC status, but on the list to graduate. The forthcoming six SIDS LDC graduates 
will do so mainly because of their country income status, as they are not making 
                                                   
3 Retrieved from Word Bank website https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-
and-lending-groups. The UN-OHRLLS makes use of slightly different list of SIDS categories as mentioned in Tierney (2018). 
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substantial progress on the reduction of economic vulnerabilities.4 This raises concerns 
regarding sustaining their development momentum as well as advancing on the broader 2030 
Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 
Most of the SIDS have seen a rise in income per capita graduating on their income status 
from lower middle-income economies to upper-middle income economies in the 1990s 
and 2000s. Where some countries like Cabo Verde, Kiribati, Federated States of Micronesia, 
and Vanuatu have been LMIC SIDS for decades; others, like Sao Tome and Principe, Comoros 
and Solomon Islands have recently graduated out of the low-income economy status of the 
World Bank - with Comoros hanging on to the lowest threshold. As Figure 1 shows, some UMIC 
SIDS are flattening at the lowest income threshold around US$4,000, like Tonga, Samoa, 
Jamaica and Fiji (other examples are Tuvalu and Marshall Islands). SIDS that have managed to 
continue their income improvements are the Maldives, Mauritius, Dominican Republic and St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines (other examples are Cuba, Dominica, Grenada and St. Lucia). The 
Seychelles became a high-income economy according to the World Bank, in 2015. Other 
countries, such as Trinidad and Tobago, and Antigua and Barbuda reached this status earlier in 
the 2000s. However, between 1990 and 2017, there have been several cases, mainly SIDS, of 
countries returning briefly to middle-income classification from high-income status (e.g. 
Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Barbados, Guam), while others (e.g. American Samoa in the late 
1980s and Nauru in 2015) briefly had high-income status, but degraded to UMICs (OECD, 
2017).5 
Figure 1. Gross National Income (GNI) per capita (current US$) using World Bank Atlas method for selected 
SIDS (1980-2017) 
 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators, available through Google Public Data6 
                                                   
4 Information retrieved from OECD blog post series Development in Transition https://oecd-development-
matters.org/2018/06/11/the-transition-from-least-developed-country-status/  
5 OECD (2017, p.7) stated that countries that reverse from high-income economies are mainly small islands states, or have 
economies dominated by petroleum (e.g. Bahrain, Equatorial Guinea, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela) or were where significant 
external shocks were amplified by domestic weaknesses (Latvia, Malta, Hungary, Korea, Russian Federation). 
6 Author’s figure based on World Bank data retrieved from Google Public Data 
https://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=d5bncppjof8f9_ 
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Graduation from LDC status to non-LDC status is a long process based on GNI per capita, 
human assets and economic vulnerability to shocks. The last two use indices that measure 
structural weakness, namely the human assets index (HAI) and the economic vulnerability index 
(EVI). The thresholds of these criteria are set, and periodically reviewed by the Committee for 
Development Policy, a subsidiary of the United Nations Economic and Social Council. To qualify 
for graduation, a LDC must have reached threshold levels for graduation for at least two of the 
three criteria, or its GNI per capita must be at least twice the graduation threshold (the ‘income 
only’ graduation rule) (Ancharaz, 2019). Of the six expected SIDS graduates by 2024, only 
Timor-Leste is expected to graduate by ‘income only’, while the other five are passing through 
their GNI per capita and HAI status. In the past, only the Maldives met all three criteria, including 
an index of economic diversification to withstand economic shocks (Ancharaz, 2019). However, it 
appears that SIDS graduate through a combination of limited diversification towards 
services, especially tourism, and investment in human capital (UNCTAD, 2016).  
Outside the LDC status, countries are mainly measured on their GNI per capita in their progress 
to high-income status. However, several institutions like bilateral donors and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), take factors other than high per capita income into 
account when classifying countries. For example, in Trinidad and Tobago at the time of 
transition to high income (US$11,905), under-5 mortality rates were at the levels of Armenia, with 
a GNI per capita of US$1,990 (OECD, 2017). Hence, according to the United Nations, some 
high-income countries may also be developing countries.  
3. Key characteristics for SIDS’ economic development 
SIDS face many challenges in their quest to achieve sustainable economic development. First, 
SIDS have small internal markets, which precludes economies of scale and, along with a 
narrow resource base, forces undue specialisation and openness to trade, exposing SIDS to 
external shocks and accentuating their inherent vulnerability. Lack of economies of scale results 
in higher costs and a lower volume of public services; a generally uncompetitive private sector, 
characterised by monopolistic firms, high production costs and a lack of product diversification; 
and high transport costs, which raise the cost of imports and reduce the export competitiveness 
of remote and geographically isolated SIDS (IMF, 2013). The OECD (2018) shows that SIDS are 
on average the most vulnerable among developing countries by using the economic vulnerability 
index. Upper middle-income SIDS are 73% more vulnerable than other upper middle-income 
countries, due to their open economies and low diversification levels. 
Not surprisingly, SIDS have suffered more from the financial crisis in 2008 than most other 
developing countries, witnessing plummeting GDP growth rates (Hurley, 2015). Over the last 
decade most SIDS, mainly in the Caribbean,7 have had slow economic growth or no economic 
growth at all (e.g. American Samoa, Aruba, Bermuda, Cuba, Curacao, Jamaica, St. Lucia). 
Others have regained some low-medium growth rates between 2% and 4% (annual GDP growth) 
in recent years (e.g. Antigua and Barbuda, Cayman Islands, Turks and Caicos Islands, and 
Vanuatu). Others see high variable GDP growth levels (high growth rates followed with negative 
growth rates): examples are Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Samoa 
and Tuvalu. Very few SIDS have persistent medium level GDP growth over 4%, but best scorers 
                                                   
7 The annual GDP performance in the Caribbean has averaged only 0.8% since 2010 (ECLAC & OECD, 2018) 
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are Grenada, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Maldives, Nauru, Sao Tome and Principe, and 
Seychelles.8  
While the causes of persistent slow growth in most SIDS require further investigation, the IMF 
(2013) points to the brain drain-induced decline in productivity and generally weak 
competitiveness. The result of slow economic growth (or high variable growth rates) and the 
inherent constraints to the development of the private sector (lack of economies of scale) mean 
that few employment opportunities exist. SIDS often exceed 10% unemployment rates, in 
particular in the Caribbean SIDS, with St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines having the 
highest unemployment rate of approximately 20%, in 2018.9 These problems are particularly 
severe among young people, with youth unemployment rates exceeding 20% in many SIDS (e.g. 
Marshall Islands, Curacao, Dominica, and French Polynesia).10 High poverty levels still exist in 
many SIDS where income inequality is amongst the highest in the world: GINI coefficients are 
40 or above, even in high-income SIDS, like Cayman Islands, Bermuda and Barbados.11  
Although SIDS, by and large, understand that services are the way to go, poor information 
technology (IT) connectivity, especially on islands far off the path of major submarine fibre 
optic cables, impedes the development of IT-enabled services and also affects other service 
sectors, such as education and health (Ancharaz, 2019; Bourne, 2015). Smallness also makes 
it difficult to train people in a wide range of areas, resulting in a shortage of staff in critical 
sectors. A consequence of lack of human resource development, along with low financial 
capacity, is that SIDS have poor representation at the level of international organisations, which 
has negative effects on their advocacy efforts (Ancharaz, 2019). Khor et al. (2016) therefore 
highlights that due to severe shortage of expertise and implementation capacity in SIDS, reform 
should be carefully prioritised to address the most serious and binding constraints affecting each 
individual country (efforts that have the greatest impact on the countries), instead of attempting to 
implement all facets of “international best practice” standards in a comprehensive single stage.  
It is well known that SIDS have a high exposure and vulnerability to natural hazards and that 
these have imposed tremendous costs in terms of loss of human lives, productive assets, 
physical infrastructure, output supply and product demand especially in agriculture and tourism. 
While the monetary value of damage from natural disasters is much larger in advanced 
economies due to the accumulation of valuable assets, at 17% SIDS have the largest losses as a 
percentage of national output (OECD, 2018). The development challenges posed by natural 
hazards are compounded by climate change, which has increased the frequency and force of 
hurricanes, caused sea level rise which threatens coastal infrastructure, beaches which are 
integral to tourism, housing settlements and fresh water supplies, and marine life and coastal 
fisheries (Bourne, 2015). 
The IMF (2013) has identified three elements of volatility common to SIDS: volatility of growth, 
external sector volatility and fiscal volatility. Although smallness per se is not associated with 
                                                   
8 Information retrieved from World Bank website, based on national accounts data and OECD national account data: 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?end=2017&name_desc=false&start=2005 
9 Information retrieved from Wold Bank website, based on ILO statistics: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS 
10 Information retrieved from World Bank website, based on ILO statistics: 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.NE.ZS 
11 Information retrieved from World Bank Open Data website https://data.worldbank.org/ 
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higher growth volatility, there is evidence that the recent slowdown of growth in SIDS has 
coincided with greater output volatility, which arises from variability in terms of trade, external 
demand and ODA (Ancharaz, 2019). Foreign direct investment (FDI) and other private finance 
flows are highly volatile and on average contribute little to SIDS’ external sources of financing: 
only 12% in 2012-15 (for the 35 ODA-eligible SIDS) compared to 35% in other ODA-eligible 
developing countries (OECD, 2018). Owing to large diasporas, remittances represent the largest 
flow of external finance for SIDS: 54% in 2012-15, compared to 27% in other developing 
countries (OECD, 2018). This reflects the lack of creditworthiness of many SIDS to raise funds in 
capital markets and, in other cases, especially in the Caribbean, the recent deterioration in 
international capital market and debt sustainability ratings (ECLAC & OECD, 2018). 
Small states have experienced greater current account and fiscal volatility compared to 
larger countries with similar income levels (IMF, 2013). Higher costs, low tax revenues and high 
fiscal volatility have resulted in debt issues: on average, the debt over GNI of SIDS (57%) is 
significantly higher than for other developing countries (47%) (OECD, 2018). UNCTAD (2018) 
mentioned that public finances have continued to be stifled by heavy debt servicing costs, which 
accounted for 16% of SIDS government revenue in 2010, and more than doubled to 40% in 
2015, particularly for Caribbean SIDS.12 “SIDS tend to have small and erratic domestic revenues, 
which combined with high costs for providing public services and the fiscal impacts of natural 
disasters, often result in limited fiscal space for development investments,” states the OECD 
(2018, Chapter 2) report. 
Box 1. Alternative sources of finance for development during graduation process 
Sustainable Development Strategic Plans and how they seek to finance investments needed to achieve the 
SDGs, should mobilise resources to substitute for ODA in middle-income SIDS. Morris et al. (2019) mentioned 
the following, in particular based on the case of Cabo Verde’s graduation from LDC: 
 Climate finance: Green Climate Fund (Green Climate Fund - GCF) and the Global Fund for Environment 
(Global Environment Fund - GEF), other innovative facilities such as Blue Bonds, Debt Swaps/ capacity 
building to access these instruments,  
 Development finance: South-South and triangular co-operation,  
 Domestic Resources Maximisation: Tax revenue through enlargement of the tax base, the reduction of 
informality, the modernisation of administrative machinery,  
 Blended finance: PPPs for example through trade boards and the Chambers for Trade and Tourism for 
investment promotion,  
 Remittances: Remittances for investment rather than consumption (through mutual funds, tax incentives for 
financial savings, facilitation of access to housing).  
In particular, the climate finance should be an important resource. Today there are large number of international 
public and private funds in operation and this number looks set to rise further in the future. Examples include the 
Adaptation Fund (AF), the Climate Investment Funds (CIF), and the Green Climate Fund (GCF), as well as new 
financial mechanisms such as performance-based payments for reducing emissions from deforestation, 
                                                   
12 ECLAC & OECD (2018, p.18): “The Caribbean countries are amongst the world’s most indebted. In 2015, 4 of the 25 most 
highly indebted countries in the world (measured by gross general government debt levels relative to GDP) were in the 
Caribbean: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Grenada and Jamaica. It is estimated that 10 Caribbean countries now have debt-
to-GDP ratios that exceed the accepted sustainability threshold of 60%. At the end of 2015, the overall debt burden amounted 
to US$ 52 billion, which on average represents 70% of the sub-region’s GDP. As a result, the Caribbean sub-region’s total debt 
service payments represented, on average, over 20% of total government revenue in 2015. Despite the high debt burden, the 
sub-region’s total debt to the rest of the world is relatively insignificant and its resolution would pose no systemic risks for global 
financial stability.” 
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degradation, and forest conservation (e.g. REDD+). Several of these funds are capitalised from innovative 
sources of finance such as a levy on fuel exports or a 2% levy on the proceeds of certified emission reduction 
issuances under the Clean Development Mechanism which are allocated to the Adaptation Fund (Hurley, 2015).  
Often however, many of these new climate and environmental funds and programmes are under-capitalised. 
Rather than reflecting the need to manage exponentially increasing resources, the development of new financing 
instruments appears as a sub-optimal response to an unresolved financing gap. In addition, an unintended 
consequence of the proliferation in funds for environmental protection and climate change is a dramatic increase 
in complexity. Requirements, processes and reporting differ markedly among the new funds and instruments 
(Hurley, 2018).  
Other funds can come from Aid for Trade and technical assistance recognised in bilateral trade agreements, like 
the CARICOM (Caribbean countries) signed with the European Union.  
4. What does graduation mean for SIDS? 
Financial and non-financial transition support is vital for sustainable economic development, in 
particular for SIDS. Countries that graduate to high-income status face the loss of ODA-
associated financial and non-financial support. The Development Assistance Committee’s 
(DAC) list of ODA recipients, designed for statistical purposes, includes all middle-income and 
low-income countries. Every three years the list is updated, eliminating countries that have been 
above the high-income threshold for three consecutive years (Fantom & Serajuddin, 2016).  
The US government also uses the World Bank’s classification in setting trade policy. For 
example, the US Trade Act of 1974 provides that the President will remove “high income” 
countries as classified by the World Bank from the list of countries benefiting from the US 
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) schemes that grant preferential duties access 
(Fantom & Serajuddin, 2016). However, a sharp fall in concessional financing or cessation 
of such financing that occurs when a country transitions from ODA-eligibility, risks 
slowing the development momentum in the country. This, in turn, can raise the likelihood of a 
transition reversal (OECD, 2017). 
Most UMIC SIDS face a so-called middle-income trap. This refers to the long-lasting slowdown in 
growth that many countries endure when they approach middle levels of per capita income. 
Arriving at UMIC status usually requires new engines of economic growth based on capital- and 
skill-intensive manufacturing capabilities and service industries, which need extensive investment 
in infrastructure and human capital, which are very costly for SIDS (OECD, 2017). To escape 
the middle-income trap, indicators for the capacity of the state to raise and spend 
resources to foster the development process and to transform national income into 
positive development outcomes are of particular interest. This is also a key discriminating 
variable that the OECD Development Centre uses to determine whether countries that escaped 
the middle-income trap in the past have progressed on other variables like rule of law, the 
dependency ratio, quality of education, the polity measure of democracy, gross capital formation, 
credit market development and export diversification (OECD, 2017).  
Another change occurs when SIDS move from LMIC to UMIC status, in particular becoming 
less dependent on ODA for governmental expenditures and infrastructural investments,  
by increasing other funds and private sector investments. In moving from low- to middle-
income status, the International Development Assistance (IDA) eligibility threshold of the World 
Bank is the most significant marker. At GNI of US$1,215 (Atlas method) in 2015, this threshold 
reflects the operational availability of concessional finance from the World Bank (graduated 
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countries see their finance extended at market terms), and guides the determination of access to 
concessional finance from a number of other multilateral financial institutions (the Asian 
Development Fund, the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the IMF) 
(OECD, 2017).13 It is also important to mention that non-LDCs could lose their UN travel 
benefits to attend international meetings, which could mean SIDS graduates have reduced 
advocacy ability and visibility on the international stage (Hurley, 2015). The OECD also 
uses the World Bank income classification for its arrangement on Officially Supported Export 
Credits: the lower middle-income threshold is the cut-off line between countries that are eligible 
for tied aid credits and those that are not (Fantom & Serajuddin, 2016).  
Furthermore, there are all kinds of preferential trade measures for LDCs that will not apply 
for middle-income countries without LDC status (e.g. the EU’s Everything but Arms free 
trade agreement and the Global System of Trade Preferences). Estimates from UNCTAD (2016) 
show that Vanuatu will particularly suffer from leaving preferential trade measures that comes 
with its LDC status, as the agricultural sector in particular will suffer from this change. By the end 
of the transition period, graduating countries have lost access to all LDC-specific Special and 
Differential Trade provisions under WTO rules and WTO-compliant regional trade agreements, 
as well as those afforded by their trading partners, retaining access only to the typically less 
generous provisions available to other developing countries (Ancharaz, 2019; Soobramanien & 
Gosset, 2015).14 
Because most SIDS are middle-income countries, this means that, for the most part, they 
are not eligible to receive concessional resources from the multilateral financial 
institutions. However, the World Bank operates ‘a small island exception’ that permits a few 
SIDS to borrow concessional finance from IDA despite higher income per capita levels (World 
Bank, 2017). Those SIDS with fewer than 1.5 million people, significant vulnerability due to size 
and geography, and very limited credit-worthiness and other financing options retain access 
(Hurley, 2015).15 Most, however, are considered ‘blend’ countries, i.e. they can borrow 
simultaneously from both IDA and the Bank’s non-concessional loan facility, at the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). Blend countries include the following SIDS: 
Cabo Verde, Dominica, Fiji, Grenada, Papua New Guinea, St Lucia, St Vincent and the 
Grenadines and Timor-Leste.16 
All others borrow on commercial terms from the multilateral lenders through IBRD. Some 
bilateral donors also use income per capita to steer aid allocation decisions, although this 
does vary between donors. Furthermore, multilateral financial institutions, such as the World 
Bank and the IMF, do not have specific graduation support programmes or mechanisms for the 
                                                   
13 Tierney (2018) gives a very detailed overview per SIDS what exact access to finance (concessional or non-concessional) and 
what climate fund and other private funds they can tap based on the different criteria, exceptions and income categories for 
SIDS. 
14 This could be the reason why SIDS were among the first to sign economic partnership agreements (EPAs) with the EU, 
which offer them the privilege of exporting duty-free and quota-free to the EU, although reciprocal. 
15 According to the World Bank website the following SIDS are eligible for IDA: Comoros, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, 
Kiribati, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Solomon Islands, Tonga, 
Tuvalu, and Vanuatu https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-
groups 
16 Information retrieved from World Bank website https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-
bank-country-and-lending-groups 
12 
LDCs. No established institutional mechanism exists for the phasing out of SIDS LDC country-
specific benefits (Hurley, 2015). As a result, entities may not always be able to support a 
country’s smooth transition process. Overall, the continuous engagement after graduation is 
mainly determined based on mutually agreed country programme frameworks.17  
Many governments have called for more favourable access to concessional resources for SIDS 
and to include a measure of vulnerability in multilaterals’ assessments as to which countries 
should be eligible for concessional finance (see some statements of government in Box 2). 
Ancharaz (2019, p.4) states: “[B]ecause the international community will be withdrawing the very 
support measures that contributed  – in part, at least – to the SIDS’ development while they were 
LDCs, it has a moral obligation to ensure that graduates do not become a victim of their 
success.”  
Box 2. Reactions from SIDS governments on graduation18 
The Maldives’ representative reported during a 2012 UN meeting that there had been a lack of progress in the 
area of development assistance and access to concessionary finance, explaining that pledges made at a donor 
conference had gone largely unfulfilled. He noted that graduation did not bring increased FDI except for the 
tourism industry, leaving his country’s structural vulnerabilities as a small island unchanged. He recalled the 
crucial role played by the Maldives’ lobbying and advocacy efforts in obtaining the granting of favourable new 
trade measures and waivers, such as the TRIPS extension until 2013 granted in the aftermath of the 2004 
Tsunami, which was later applied to all LDCs. The Maldives’ promotion of its SVE status articulated during the 
Trade Policy Review (TPR) resulted in the extension of the Everything but Arms (EBA) trade agreement with the 
EU.  
At the same UN meeting, the Solomon Islands’ representative underscored the need for predictability, outlining 
that many SIDS LDC country programmes were unrelated to the Barbados Programme of Action (BPoA), and 
stressed the need for better coordination of UN system activities on the ground. He stressed that many LDC 
country programmes were not related some special SIDS development action programmes: their focus was on 
institutions, gender, etc. but not on the productive sector, with limited resources to focus on a few game-changing 
issues, e.g. agriculture or energy. He also stressed the need for better coordination of the UN system’s activities 
on the ground. 
Prime Minister Browne of Antigua and Barbuda questioned during a UN meeting in 2018 the validity of 
modalities used to assess development levels. He said his small, vulnerable country was disqualified from access 
to concessional loans and grants due to “skewed constructs of what represents development”. People in middle-
income countries were being punished for their adherence to human and political rights and the openness of their 
economies to foreign investment, he said. Small groups of expatriates received most of the profits from those 
investments, while arbitrary rules imposed by a handful of rich countries made economic diversification difficult. 
Fair trade, access to finance, anti-competition rules and debt burden should be among the factors used to 
measure development as opposed to simply using per capita income, he said, warning that middle-income 
countries will witness economic decline and social dislocation if the way they are assessed does not change. 
President Michel of the Seychelles highlighted in 2017, when his country received the high-income economy 
status, the importance of looking at development beyond the reductive practice of simply measuring GNI per 
capita. He reiterated the importance of addressing the specific concerns of SIDS and in particular the need to 
                                                   
17 Information retrieved from OECD blog post series Development in Transition https://oecd-development-
matters.org/2018/06/11/the-transition-from-least-developed-country-status/ 
18 Sources used: Statements on Maldives and Solomon Islands were retrieved from the UNOHRLLS website 
http://www.unohrlls.org/UserFiles/File/LDC%20Documents/AHWG%20on%20smooth%20transition/SUMMARY%20RECORD%
20AHWG%2026%20March.pdf. The statement on Antigua and Barbuda was retrieved from the UN website 
https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/ga12098.doc.htm. The statement on the Seychelles was retrieved from the website of the 
Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Seychelles 
http://www.mfa.gov.sc/static.php?content_id=18&news_id=1071 
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couple all measures of development in the context of countries’ vulnerability such as through a vulnerability 
index. He stressed that 'high income status' should not be a means to exclude countries like Seychelles and 
other SIDS from legitimate development tools that allow them to adapt and build resilience against both the 
vagaries of the global economy and climate change. 
5. Evidence on the impacts of graduation  
Next to the key characteristics and constraints of SIDS for economic development as afore 
mentioned, graduation itself and its changes in access to concessional finance, development 
assistance and preferential trade may have impacts on SIDS. There is no abundance in 
literature with a focus on the actual impacts of graduation than some evaluation reports from 
the UN-OHRLLS (which are more procedural than profound research on developmental 
impacts). Most literature focusses on the challenges of SIDS in general and their needs to 
access new kind of funding, like climate funding or bonds. However, very recently there seems to 
be some interests to study more profoundly the impacts of graduation as some studies from the 
OECD (e.g. Morris et al., 2019) and the Commonwealth Secretariat (e.g. Ancharaz, 2018) show.    
Debt and vulnerability 
It is important to note that several of the countries which are IBRD eligible only (i.e. eligible 
for non-concessional finance only) are precisely those countries in which debt problems 
have been more pronounced, e.g. Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Jamaica, the Seychelles 
and St. Kitts and Nevis (Hurley, 2015). Morris et al. (2019) show that for Cabo Verde (access to 
blend finance), external debt increased substantially after LDC graduation in 2007. Debt reached 
129% of GDP and 134% GNI in 2018. Private debt on commercial terms is the fastest growing 
source of external debt, increasing seven-fold since LDC graduation. Morris et al. (2019) further 
show that external multilateral debt provided on non-concessional terms represents the second 
fastest growing source. During the same time period Cabo Verde suffered from extreme weather 
conditions, extreme rainfall, hurricanes and drought, and volcanic activity, with damage costing 
over US$40 million since 2012 (Morris et al., 2019). The other graduate Samoa (still eligible for 
IDA under exception rules) has also seen increased debt pressure (IMF, 2018). The recovery 
efforts and reconstruction required after the 2009 tsunami and 2012 Cyclone Evan were largely 
financed by borrowing, pushing total public debt close to 58% of GDP in 2014/15. Samoa’s debt 
is still largely concessional and long-term; however, according to the IMF (2018), the debt 
restructuring is highly vulnerable to external shocks, such as natural disasters.  
SIDS have on average higher debt levels than other developing countries (King & Tennant, 
2014). This is not only the case for low-income and LMIC SIDS, as Barbados, Bahamas, Antigua 
and Barbuda, St. Lucia, Jamaica and Grenada, have above 35% total debt service payments 
compared with total government revenues (data from 2013) (Bourne, 2015). In 2017, the IMF 
(2017) classified 20 of the 35 ODA eligible SIDS as “moderate” risk, “high” risk and “in 
debt distress”. Grenada is the only SIDS in debt distress, but since 2016, three SIDS – Cabo 
Verde, Haiti and Samoa – have moved from a moderate to a high-risk level of debt distress 
(Cabo Verde and Samoa are graduates from LDC status) joining eight other SIDS. Of the high-
income SIDS that are non-eligible for ODA, Barbados, Antigua and Barbuda, and Aruba in 
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particular have high debt–GDP (economic growth) ratios of 157%, 87% and 87% respectively in 
2017.19  
Debt-to-GNI ratios (for 2015) are particularly high in UMICs (as well as Cabo Verde as LMIC and 
the afore mentioned high-income SIDS) that are outside the Pacific region: e.g. Mauritius 
(128%), Jamaica (103%), Cabo Verde (98%), Belize (82%), Grenada (73%), Dominica (63%). 
Samoa (60%) has the highest ratio for the Pacific SIDS. Five SIDS – Comoros, Haiti, Guinea 
Bissau, Guyana, and Sao Tome and Principe – benefitted from the HIPC Initiative, which 
contributed to bring down their debt from an average of 196% of GNI in 2000 to 35% in 2015 
(OECD, 2018). Debt-to-GNI ratios for the remaining SIDS are on the rise, having reached 
62% in 2015, up from 44% in 2000. This is higher than other developing countries with on 
average approximately 50% debt-to-GNI ratio (OECD, 2018). Average debt service-to-exports 
ratio also worsened substantially from 8.6% in 2008 to 19.2% in 2017, while the ratio of external 
debt to exports rose from 67.4% to 163.8% of GDP (UNCTAD, 2018).  
This debt burden for SIDS increases their vulnerability to economic shocks and natural disasters. 
UNCTAD (2018; 2017) shows that rising debt vulnerabilities in SIDS are related to fast 
global financial integration, open trade, lack of economies of scale, in particular combined 
with the exposure to natural disasters (see also King & Tennant, 2014). The long-term 
environmental challenges faced by these countries are compounded by high levels of external 
economic vulnerability and public debt, which create a vicious cycle. In particular, countries in the 
Caribbean recurrently use public debt to absorb the impact of external shocks and natural 
disasters (UNCTAD, 2017). In turn, higher levels of public debt constrain capacity to effectively 
address vulnerabilities. As a result, each new wave of shocks and disasters simultaneously 
amplifies vulnerabilities and weakens domestic response capacity. 
Research results by Mitchell et al. (2018) suggest that debt to GDP ratios indeed increase in 
SIDS following storms and floods and that the changes in debt ratios are statistically 
significant. They conclude that floods lead to faster debt accumulation than storms, and that 
debt increases less in non-SIDS, mainly because of their stronger macro-economic 
fundamentals. Aid relief is found to play a significant mitigating role in SIDS. However, aid 
increases following an exogenous expansion in the primary surplus, but this trend reverses fairly 
quickly (Mitchell et al., 2018). 
Due to their relative remoteness and size, many SIDS have a relatively narrow resource base to 
drive their industrial development. A few key industries including fisheries, tourism and 
agriculture help in contributing a significant share to national GDP. The adverse impact of climate 
change makes SIDS already open and exposed economies therefore even more vulnerable (UN-
OHRLLS, 2017). Some literature have measured the costs. Acevedo (2014) finds negative 
effects from both storms and floods in Caribbean countries. Loayza et al. (2009) find that 
although small disasters may have a positive effect in the short term (owing to reconstruction 
boosting growth, for example), the short-term effect of large disasters on growth is always 
negative. Some international organisations have also estimated the cost of natural disasters and 
climate change in terms of reduced economic growth. According to the World Bank (2014), 
                                                   
19 Information retrieved from Photius website, based on data from the CIA World Factbook 2019 
https://photius.com/rankings/2019/economy/public_debt_2019_0.html 
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natural disasters in the Pacific SIDS cause damage, every year on average, of nearly 2% of 
GDP (about US$248 million).  
For climate change, the Asia Development Bank (ADB) estimates economic costs for the Pacific 
islands of 2.2 to 3.5% of GDP annually, which could rise to as high as 12.7% by the end of the 
century (ADB, 2013). The ADB also estimates that preparing for the effects of climate change 
may cost between 1.5 and 2.5% of GDP a year. Cabezon et al. (2016) estimated the impact of 
natural disasters on long-term growth for the Pacific SIDS (Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, 
Tonga, Vanuatu). They concluded that for damage and losses equal to 1% of GDP, growth in 
these countries falls on average by 0.3 percentage point over 10 years. Therefore they conclude 
that the long-term impact of natural disasters on GDP growth is substantial. After a 
disaster, with damage and losses equal to 60% of GDP, growth falls by 18 percentage points, 
resulting in a 10-year growth loss of 16% on a cumulative basis (Cabezon et al., 2016). 
To link this with graduation, it can be concluded that recent graduates Cabo Verde and 
Samoa are increasingly indebted now at a “high risk” status, while many UMIC SIDS seem 
to be stuck with high total debt payments due to their vulnerabilities to natural disasters 
in particular, reducing their ability to maximise economic growth and invest in further 
economic development. For low-income SIDS, LDC status already takes into account climate 
vulnerability and recent exceptions to IDA access have significantly increased concessional 
finance flows. For this group, the challenge is now to mobilise these resources and tailor 
programmes to address the specific needs between and within each country (Tierney, 2018). 
This will require coordinated technical assistance from a range of regional and international 
agencies to supplement and build national capacities and deliver transformational change across 
all sectors of the economy.20 For middle-income SIDS the financing outlook is less clear. 
Eligibility for concessional finance for this group of SIDS is closely associated with conventional 
concept of national income level.  
SIDS need to access assistance from the international community in addressing 
economic and environmental vulnerabilities and associated catastrophic risks.21 For 
example, the most important initiative in this regard is the Green Climate Fund, established in 
2010 as part of the financial mechanism of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. The Green Climate Fund is expected to mobilise US$100 billion a year by 2020 to be 
invested worldwide in climate change mitigation and adaptation projects (UNCTAD, 2017). 
However, the main concern is that resource allocation is based on the same approach currently 
used for the allocation of ODA and concessional lending, making most SIDS ineligible to access 
the fund (UNCTAD, 2017). Another concern is that graduated countries, like Cabo Verde, 
have lost access to the National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPA), which helped 
                                                   
20 Some examples show that climate change funding is available. For example, Samoa gained access to the UNFCCC LDC 
Fund after graduation due to some rules of exception for vulnerable SIDS. A climate change adaption and disaster risk 
reduction project ($12 million grant) was approved under LDC Fund in October 2014. A flood management project was 
approved under the Green Climate Fund in December 2016. 
21 According to World Bank (2018) these existing financing includes the Adaptation Fund (including Direct Access), GCF, GEF, 
Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF), Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF), Climate Investment Funds (CIFs including 
the Pilot Partnership for Climate Resilience), MDBs (including IDA with its focus on small states), GFDRR, and bilateral donors. 
In addition, funds available after a disaster include IDA’s CRW, IMF Standard Window, IMF Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Trust Fund, IMF Catastrophe Containment and Relief Fund, insurance facilities such as Pacific Catastrophe Risk Assessment 
and Finance Initiative (PCRAFI) being converted into a Facility, Caribbean equivalent (CCRIF), and Africa Risk Capacity 
Insurance Facility. For low emissions—renewable energy, energy efficiency, forests— CIFs (SREP, FIP, DGM); GEF, MDBs 
(IDA, IBRD equivalent), GCF, and bilateral donors. 
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to strengthen climate change adaptation strategies and access to financing (Morris et al., 
2019). Without NAPA support, many sources of climate financing such as the Green Climate 
Fund require technical capacity and expertise that are challenging for SIDS with small 
administrations. SIDS also face challenges in identifying the risks and impacts of natural 
disasters and, consequently, in securing resources in their national budgets. High 
implementation charges further reduce the benefits received by SIDS through intermediary 
agencies. Due to these constraints, Cabo Verde has not yet accessed the Green Climate Fund 
financing (Morris et al. 2019). 
UNTCAD (2018, p.8) states: “While the international community has to an extent recognized the 
need to pay specific attention to the plight of small island developing States facing recurrent debt 
and financial distress in the wake of their environmental vulnerability, a more encompassing 
multilateral approach to address systematic underinvestment in climate change adaptation in the 
long term – and an inappropriate reliance on domestic resource mobilization and short-term 
insurance mechanisms – will be required.” 
Economic and human development  
Economic and human development in SIDS varies very much per country and per region. Before 
1990, the Human Development Index increased steadily for SIDS as a whole, but improvements 
slowed in the 1990s and 2000s, and have further slowed since the financial crisis in 2008 
(Hurley, 2015). A more detailed look at several countries that have in some way been 
involved in graduation processes in recent decades (Cabo Verde, Maldives, Mauritius, 
Seychelles, Samoa, Antigua and Barbuda, and Jamaica), shows that no conclusions can 
be made from existing literature on clear trends with regard to what graduation means for 
economic and human development. There are too many variables, such as size, existence of 
natural resources, access to global tourism markets, political stability and good governance; this 
rapid review could find no literature that compared all of them with the graduation process. 
By looking to what sectors ODA flows, no clear pathway is visible. As total ODA may reduce after 
graduation, it seems that there is a shift away from social infrastructure like education and 
health care towards climate change resilience, the productive sectors and economic 
infrastructure.22 A focus on private sector development ODA is mainly the case in countries 
such as the Seychelles, the Maldives, Samoa23 and Jamaica (including multi sector ODA).24 
Also, it is clear for Cabo Verde (LMIC SIDS) that since graduation in 2007 it has witnessed a 
                                                   
22 Authors own observation based on data from OECD website on ODA: http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-
development/development-finance-data/aid-at-a-glance.htm and also mentioned in the 2015 OECD flyer Small island 
developing states (SIDS): financing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which can be retrieved from 
https://www.oecd.org/dac/environment-development/SIDS_flyer_COP.pdf  
23 Samoa continues to be supported by its development partners through investments in particular the infrastructure sector 
particularly in the transport sector. New activities include the construction of an upgraded airport terminal building including 
runway, taxiway and apron and equipment; the construction of more resilient road networks and bridges rehabilitation in 
addition to recently completed roads built as part of the Cyclone Evan Recovery programme. Increases in households‟ access 
to water supplies were achieved with almost 90% of the total coverage areas having access to treated water supplies and basic 
sanitation services. Conservation of water catchment areas has progressed with increased community commitment to 
implement approved watershed management plans. There is a growing number of renewable energy projects approved to be 
undertaken under the auspices of Government with development partners cooperation as well as investments by the private 
sector through Power Purchasing Agreements. The number of renewable energy technologies used has increased with multiple 
solar panel plants in place and extension of hydro electric plants expected to begin operations in 2017‐2019.  
24 Information retrieved from OECD website http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-
data/aid-at-a-glance.htm 
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significant reduction of ODA to support education (-30%). ODA in health care remains low 
compared to other SIDS. The share of Cabo Verdean government spending in support of 
health and education has declined (-1.5% in education and -0.4% in health over the 2012-16 
period) (Morris et al., 2019). In parallel, Cabo Verde receives significant increasing bilateral 
support for water supply and sanitation and renewable energy (Morris et al., 2019). Overall, 
for all ODA recipient SIDS, investments in education are not meeting the need to produce 
the skilled workforce necessary to diversify their economies, increase productivity, 
employment and wages. However, in some UMIC SIDS, such as Mauritius, ODA is mainly 
focussing on education (another example is Suriname). Furthermore, humanitarian aid is an 
important contributor to recover from natural disasters, even for a high-income country like 
Antigua and Barbuda, which had zero ODA in 2016, but received ODA in 2017 after 
Hurricane Irma.25  
As ODA will reduce, SIDS have to find other ways to access crucial funding. One solution is to 
successfully leverage Other Official Funds (OOF) to strengthen private sector engagement, (e.g. 
upgrading tourism value chains and sustainable fisheries). However, OOF does not fill the 
gaps in social sectors as ODA is reduced. Some SIDS struggle, to access OOF (e.g. Cabo 
Verde), while others succeed (e.g. the Maldives, Jamaica and Mauritius – other examples are 
Suriname and Dominican Republic). In particular, capacity to increase access to these funds is 
necessary for countries in transition (Morris et al., 2019).   
On the other hand, private sector actors can invest in crucial parts of the domestic economy. For 
SIDS these private sector actors are located overseas, and increasingly coming from South-
South relations (e.g. China and India) (UNCTAD, 2014). However, FDI net inflows vary very 
much per SIDS. The Maldives is doing well in attracting FDI after graduation and is now in 
the top five recipient SIDS. Investments are mainly going to tourism and construction, making 
the country’s economy heavily dependent on tourism and highly vulnerable to shocks, as 
indicated by the persistently high level of its economic vulnerability index (EVI). However, flows 
of FDI into Cabo Verde have decreased considerably since their peak in 2008, although FDI 
inflows to Cabo Verde represent a higher relative share of external financing compared to other 
SIDS. In 2018, inflows totalled US$100 million, a slight decrease compared to 2017 (US$111 
million).26 The tourism sector is the largest recipient of FDI in Cabo Verde. Samoa’s FDI is also 
mainly in tourism and fluctuates significantly. Overall, considering all SIDS, it can be concluded 
that the most attractive SIDS for FDI are those rich in mineral resources (Trinidad and 
Tobago, Jamaica, Papua New Guinea); those that offer fiscal advantages to foreign capital 
(Bahamas, Barbados, Seychelles); and those that have a relatively bigger market size 
(Mauritius, Jamaica), while the combination of remoteness, small population, low income, 
and lack of natural resources is a deterrent to FDI (UNCTAD, 2014).  
Employment statistics show that the Maldives has seen a clear continual increase in 
unemployment and youth unemployment since graduation, with total unemployment rate in 2018 
at 6.2% and youth unemployment at 14%. This is part of a long-term trend since the late 1990s.27 
                                                   
25 Information retrieved from OECD website http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-
data/aid-at-a-glance.htm 
26 Information retrieved from the World Bank Open Data website https://data.worldbank.org/ 
27 Idem 
18 
The private sector jobs are heavily dependent on tourism and highly vulnerable to shocks. The 
Maldives also has an important fishery industry, but while it survived the loss of trade 
preferences in the European Union market and Japan by diversifying to other export 
destinations, this has certainly contributed to the sector’s declining importance, notably in the 
case of the tuna industry (UN, 2018).28 Samoa has an unemployment rate of around 8.5%, which 
is stable since its graduation in 2014, however, it is still significantly higher than before 2012 
when Samoa had around 5.5% unemployment.29 Cabo Verde has a high unemployment rate of 
12%; after graduation this went up quickly (although at the same time as the financial crisis) and 
reached its highest point of nearly 17% in 2012 after which it has fallen again. Jamaica has a 
high unemployment rate, like most Caribbean SIDS, but it has shown a consistent fall in the 
unemployment rate to 8% in 2018.30 Mauritius has a stable unemployment rate of around 7% 
and Seychelles around 4%.31 Youth unemployment remains high, in particular in Samoa, 
Jamaica, Cabo Verde, Mauritius, Antigua and Barbuda. In the latter country, which is a high-
income country (with a history of degradation) unemployment rates are the highest recorded as 
14% in 2015 census. Youth unemployment was even recorded at 50%.32 
Overall, it can be concluded that unemployment and the creation of new employment 
opportunities represent a key challenge for many governments, which have traditionally 
acted as the ‘employer of last resort’. This, in turn, has led to bloated and costly public 
administrations (as well as helped to exacerbate public debt burdens). The social safety net is 
not well-developed in many countries and the high unit cost of social service provision means 
that their sustainability is constantly challenged. The result is that SIDS have high income 
inequality rates. For example, in Cabo Verde, the country’s GINI coefficient has increased to 
51 in 2013 from 45 in 2007 and poverty reduction across the islands is uneven (Morris et al., 
2019). Samoa graduated in 2014, since when income growth has reduced. The UN (2017) 
Committee for Development Policy monitoring report shows that there is no sign of progress or 
regress in the income or HAI indicators. No statistics on GINI coefficient after 2014 could be 
found for Samoa. On the other hand, the Maldives is slowly reducing income inequality as 
measured in GINI from just above 40 before graduation to just below 40 in 2013.33 Seychelles 
witnessed an increase in GINI in 2015 at a level of nearly 47, while it is measured stable for 
Mauritius at 35. It does not seem that any clear message comes out from the graduation 
process in SIDS on employment and inequality, but pockets of poor and vulnerable 
communities persist due to low-income levels, insecurity and exposure to natural 
disasters and climate change. FDI is not always targeting the best employment opportunities 
                                                   
28 However, and in addition, Maldives is diversifying its export markets and incentivising environmentally sustainable fishing 
value chains. Through the use of ecolabels or Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) certification, the country has created a price 
premium for local fishermen and the possibility for consumers to make more informed choices. 
29 In particular, for Samoa graduation in 2014 did not yet change a lot for the economy. Samoa continues to enjoy duty-free 
quota-free treatment under the Everything But Arms initiative for a period of three years; and a similar transition period has 
been negotiated, at least for some key products, with other trading partners. Samoa also continues to enjoy access to 
concessional borrowing from multilateral financial institutions, and to receive technical assistance and financial support to 
attend United Nations meetings. 
30 Information retrieved from the World Bank Open Data website https://data.worldbank.org/ 
31 Idem 
32 Information retrieved from https://antiguaobserver.com/report-places-abs-youth-unemployment-rate-at-50-per-cent/ 
33 Information retrieved from the World Bank Open Data website https://data.worldbank.org/ 
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and poor linkages (forward and backward) with local productive sectors exist, nor between job 
demand and supply (e.g. there seems to be a tendency of rent-seeking) (UNCTAD, 2014). In that 
sense, related to (youth) unemployment, inequality and poverty (but also related to drug routes), 
in particular for the Caribbean, crime has become one of the main challenges threatening 
economies and livelihoods.34  
Evidence on the impacts of graduation on state effectiveness  
There is evidence that economies that have successfully transitioned from ODA eligibility 
since 1985 (including SIDS) have exhibited a number of key policy characteristics, notably 
strong rule of law, quality education and capabilities to mobilise domestic resources (tax 
revenue) (UNCTAD, 2016). This means that state effectiveness and good governance are both 
important drivers to succeed. In particular for LMIC SIDS that already have relatively high 
domestic resources (e.g. 20% tax-to-GDP ratio in Cabo Verde), fiscal space is limited, putting 
pressure on domestic expenditure to ensure debt sustainability and finance the SDG gaps 
(Morris et al., 2019). As a result, many LMIC SIDS’ governments remain highly dependent on 
ODA, while they need to improve capacity to access other forms of external finance, like OOF 
and climate finance, while also mobilising domestic resources. Support must be targeted to 
help countries identify, model, and implement the tax policies needed to increase 
expenditure, particularly in key social sectors (e.g. health and education). In order to 
reduce aid dependency, OECD DAC members must provide investments that secure long-term 
sustainable development. Understanding how to better target domestic resource mobilisation and 
public financial management will be essential to balance country ownership and long-term 
strategic interests that will benefit them in the graduation process. 
Domestic public financing is challenging for many SIDS. On the one hand, the provision of 
public goods tends to be more expensive on a per capita basis compared to countries with larger 
(and more concentrated) populations. Tax revenues as a percent of GDP would probably have to 
be even higher in SIDS than in many other countries because the marginal cost of public good 
provision is higher (Hurley, 2015). On the other hand, increasing trade liberalisation leads to 
eroding tax bases for many SIDS that are highly dependent on trade taxation for generating tax 
revenue. Some SIDS have managed to broaden the personal income tax base, but many rely 
significantly on indirect taxation, especially value added and sales taxes which can be regressive 
(Hurley, 2015). Widespread tax exemptions meanwhile help translate into low collection levels in 
many countries. Efforts to control tax avoidance and evasion (and other illicit flows) have also, in 
many cases, been weak (Hurley, 2015). 
Domestic revenues can be volatile in SIDS given the relatively narrow productive bases 
concentrated in sectors that are exposed to external fluctuations. SIDS that rely on natural 
resource rents or tourism as their primary export sectors are especially prone to fluctuating 
domestic and tax revenues. In Timor-Leste, for example, tax revenues accounted for 103% of 
GDP in 2010, rising to 133% in 2012 before falling to 40% in 2015 (OECD, 2018). 
Tax revenues as percentage of GDP shows that over the years most SIDS graduates’ 
governments increased revenues compared to their GDP. Only Cabo Verde witnessed a 
                                                   
34 The Caribbean are well known for its position between South America’s production of drugs and the markets in North 
America and Europe. Recently, some reported an increase of Pacific islands in drug routes. Information retrieved from 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/24/the-new-drug-highway-pacific-islands-at-centre-of-cocaine-trafficking-boom 
20 
decrease after graduation, but has improved this ratio since 2014.35 Taxes from income, profits 
and capital gains as a percentage of total tax revenues have been particularly going downwards 
in Jamaica (to 28% in 2017), while in the long-term in Seychelles, Mauritius and Samoa have an 
upward trend up to 29%, 20% and 19% respectively.36 The Maldives in particular has reported an 
increase since graduation from 3% to 20%, while Cabo Verde has a relatively stable revenue 
from income, profits and capital gains. The opposite is true for taxes on international trade as a 
percentage of total tax revenues. Jamaica has increased these taxes (around 35%), while 
Seychelles and Mauritius decreased this as percentage of total tax revenues over the long run 
(under 5%).37 Samoa and Cabo Verde stabilised their percentage on 9% and 13% respectively, 
while the Maldives saw a sharp decrease after graduation from 27% to 14%.38  
Besides limited domestic revenue generation, the high unit costs of services have a 
significant effect on public finances, leading to larger public sector expenditures than in 
other developing countries. This is especially true in Pacific SIDS, where small populations are 
often scattered across a multitude of islands, compared to developing countries of a similar 
income level (Horscroft, 2014). Government expenses accounted for 29% of GDP in SIDS, 
compared to 22% in other developing countries in 2014 (OECD, 2018). For Maldives Cabo 
Verde, Jamaica, Samoa and Jamaica, this is between 23% in Samoa and 33% in Seychelles.39 
After graduation Cabo Verde and Maldives have seen their expenses as percentage of 
GDP increased, like other SIDS as Mauritius and Seychelles.  
Compared to other developing countries, a larger share of public expenditure is also current 
expenditure and not capital investment. The importance of public sector employment meanwhile 
implies that states have high expenditures not only in terms of public service provision, but also 
in terms of their wage bill varying between 35-40% of total government expenses in countries like 
Maldives, Cabo Verde, Jamaica, Samoa and Jamaica.40 Furthermore, SIDS’ domestic savings 
rates are much lower than other developing nations. SIDS’ average savings rate is half 
that of upper middle-income countries (11% versus 22% in 2014) despite many SIDS being 
classified as middle-income countries. This means a smaller pool of domestic resources on 
which to draw to fund investment and development (Hurley, 2015).  
In summary, Horscroft (2014) concludes for the Pacific islands that the extent to which the 
relatively large public sectors in these countries are ‘crowding out’ private sector activity 
seems likely to be quite limited and that the flip-side of this situation must also be taken into 
account. That is, there is also an extent to which the public sectors in most pacific islands are 
‘crowding in’ private sector activity. It is certainly true that the private sectors are quite small, but 
Horscroft (2014) suggests that this is probably not primarily because the public sectors are large, 
but that the private sectors are small due to smallness and remoteness from major markets. It is 
                                                   
35 Information retrieved from the World Bank Open Data website https://data.worldbank.org/ 
36 Idem 
37 Idem 
38 Idem 
39 Idem 
40 Idem 
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this – rather than the large size of their public sectors – that is likely to be the key constraint on 
the range of feasible private sector activity. 
Box 3. Recommendations for a shift in development aid for SIDS graduates 
What can development agencies do to support SIDS through the graduation process? The World Bank (2017) 
mentions seven priority areas: 
 Inclusion of Vulnerability as a Criterion for Concessional Financing: This priority action area explores 
how best to address the specific vulnerabilities and the unique financial and institutional capacity challenges 
that small states face.  
 Predictability of Affordable Financing: IDA 18 has significantly enhanced IDA support to small states; 
however, many small states continue to face the central financing challenge of enhancing the predictability of 
resources and securing a reliable flow of funds to close their financing gap.  
 Debt Sustainability: To address debt challenges, small states focus on debt relief opportunities and 
innovative instruments to work with partners to address debt sustainability, increase domestic resource 
mobilisation, and crowd in private sector investment. 
 Access to New and Existing Climate Financing: To develop instruments that will increase small states’ 
access to climate finance, and to develop a dedicated platform with the Green Climate Fund and the Global 
Environment Facility to more effectively discuss issues around financing and donor fragmentation.  
 Capacity Building and Technical Assistance: Donor fragmentation in small states hinders the effective 
use of financing for achieving development outcomes. In light of the significant increase in IDA resources 
and anticipated increase in engagement, this action area highlights options to address small states’ 
chronically limited absorptive capacity and institutional constraints that hinder their ability to manage donor 
resources.  
 Diversification of Small States’ Economies: Where multiple asset types and economic options provide 
resilience, lack of such economic diversity leaves small states dependent on the economic and political 
situations of neighboring transit countries, as well as vulnerable to economic and climate shocks.  
 Access to Financial Markets: Many large financial entities are effectively cutting ties between banks in 
small states and global finance. A decline in correspondent banking relationships is having damaging results 
at the individual and community levels, particularly by affecting remittance. 
The OECD calls for “transition finance” to finance sustainable development for SIDS that go through graduation 
processes. OECD main policy recommendations are:41  
 Better anticipation and preparation of substitutions – using ODA and non-concessional flows (Other 
Official Flows – OOF) to support a sustainable transition finance path;  
 Better support to countries in transition through adequate capacity building (e.g. debt management 
support), investment in enablers (e.g. domestic resource mobilisation, trade and investment promotion) and 
in channels (e.g. financial system, business environment);  
 Better mitigation of the effects of ODA phasing-out and resilience building, as well as definition of new 
forms of co-operation less funding-focused.  
ECLAC and OECD (2018) recommended:  
 
A mechanism of swapping debt for climate change adaptation measures which may be a useful tool in building 
a viable solution for their heavy indebtedness. In exchange for a given extent of debt forgiveness or cancellation, 
the debtor country allocates funds to environmental conservation projects. These projects may deal with such areas 
as natural resource management, investment in renewable energy technologies and climate adaptation, building 
resilience, education and training, and the designation and management of protected areas. 
 
                                                   
41 Information retrieved from the OECD 2019 flyer on transition finance https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-
development/development-finance-topics/Transition-Finance-Main-Findings-2019.pdf   
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OECD (2018) highlights three priority areas for SIDS finance for development, which are important in successfully 
graduating to higher income levels: 
 Enhancing access, modalities and partnerships for concessional finance: To help SIDS manage 
external resources more effectively and tap into a larger array of resources, development partners will need 
to invest in more systematic and long-term approaches for strengthening national capacities and releasing 
absorptive capacity constraints. The revival of budget support in some SIDS, especially in the Pacific, is 
welcome and could be further expanded to other SIDS where the use of budget support is currently limited. 
Attention should be paid to the new ‘conditionalities’ attached to budget support, to ensure that SIDS 
governments preserve ownership.  
 Using concessional finance innovatively to leverage additional resources for sustainable 
development: Development partners can support the adoption of adequate policy and regulatory 
frameworks as well as provide support to increase the economic and financial viability of income-generating 
activities. Official finance can be used more catalytically to de-risk investments or structure returns in a way 
to mobilise finance from the private sector through new and emerging blended finance arrangements. 
Development partners can support the design and implementation of innovative financial instruments, such 
as green and blue bonds - including by backing them through blending arrangements - to help mobilise 
financing from private investors.  
 Channelling concessional resources to priority areas: Development partners can help SIDS explore new 
development paradigms and approaches to break dependence from fossil fuels, build climate resilience, and 
grasp the opportunities of the blue economy for sustainable development. Development partners need to 
encourage a transition to low-carbon economies, including by helping SIDS address barriers to investments 
for renewable energy, such as high initial costs. This would in turn significantly reduce the import bill for 
SIDS, with positive impacts on the fiscal space available for sustainable development investments.  
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